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Attorney General Taney  the South
Carolina Police Bill
H. JeÖerson Powell

A

lthough the systematic preservation
of the opinions of the Attorneys General
of the United States began with Attorney General William Wirt (1817-1829), they
were not publicly available until the House of
Representatives published a collection in 1841.
In July 1850, the House called on President
Millard Filmore to make available the opinions
written since 1841, and Filmore asked a
distinguished lawyer named Benjamin F. Hall
to undertake the task. Hall went beyond the
House request and edited a two-volume
compilation, with headnotes and indices, that
included opinions from 1791-on. In 1852,
Robert Farnham published Hall’s work on a
commercial basis as the OÓcial Opinions of the
Attorneys General of the United States.1 Hall did a
generally good job of locating and presenting
the opinions, although he missed or omitted
some early opinions of great interest, including
Edmund Randolph’s 1791 discussion of the
great question of the constitutionality of a

national bank. In addition, as Farnham
obliquely acknowledged in the “Advertisement” introducing volume one of the OÓcial
Opinions, the collection was not intended to be
complete: it contained “all the opinions which,
in view of the public interests, have been
deemed proper for publication.” Hall and
Farnham, it would seem, knew of some
opinions that they did not think it consistent
with the public interest to publish.
The Hall/Farnham collection did not
include what was perhaps Attorney General
Roger Brooke Taney’s most interesting opinion on issues of constitutional law. The
opinion, which Taney issued to Secretary of
State Edward Livingston on May 28, 1832,
and followed up with a supplementary memorandum on June 9, 1832, addressed an 1822
South Carolina statute (henceforth, “the
Police Bill”) which provided that seamen of
African descent on board a ship entering a
South Carolina port were liable to arrest and

JeÖ Powell is a Professor of Law at Duke University.
1 See Homer Cummings & Carl McFarland, Federal Justice 91-92 (1937).
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conÕnement until the ship’s departure, and
required the ship’s captain to reimburse the
state for its expenses in doing so on pain of a
Õne and of the sailor being sold into slavery.2
For a decade after its enactment, the British
government made repeated protests over the
Police Bill’s application to British mariners of
color, which the British authorities saw as a
violation of a commercial convention between the United States and the United
Kingdom Õrst agreed to in 1818. The American response to these protests was mixed:
Justice William Johnson held the Police Bill
unconstitutional in an 1823 circuit opinion,
and Attorney General Wirt reached the same
conclusion the following year, while in 1831
Attorney General John McPherson Berrien
sustained its validity and denied that it
contravened the treaty.3 Of greatest interest
to the British was the fact that South
Carolina continued enforcing the Police Bill
without regard to the controversy it was
thereby creating.
It is unclear today whether Hall and Farnham decided not to publish Taney’s opinion
on the Police Bill because they thought it
inappropriate to do – an entirely plausible
scenario in the politically charged atmosphere of the early 1850s; because the extant
copies both of the main opinion and of the
supplement are drafts; or because Hall
somehow overlooked it.4 In fact, although
Taney’s opinion is well-known to historians
working in the period, it has never before
been published. The Green Bag’s invitation
to prepare the opinion for publication is a

welcome one, both for its intrinsic interest as
an historical document and because of the
light it sheds on antebellum constitutional
thought. This essay consists of three sections:
section i provides an introduction to the
context of the opinion; section ii presents the
texts of the main opinion, the supplement,
and the cover letter that accompanied the
supplement as well as information about this
edition; section iii brieÔy comments on
Taney’s reasoning.

I. The Context of
Taney’s Opinion
Personalities  politics
The presidency of Andrew Jackson was a
period of intense political and constitutional
controversy. Old Hickory was himself a source
of controversy, and he also acted as a lightning
rod to which many of the cross-cutting
currents of the era were drawn. Jackson was
elected in 1828 as the candidate of reform and
Republicanism, elevated (as he saw it) by the
people to cleanse government of the elitist
corruption and crypto-Federalist heresies of
the administration of John Quincy Adams.
Jackson, and it would seem most of his
supporters, saw in this a return to the principles of Thomas JeÖerson, who had similarly
delivered the Republic in the election of 1800
from the elitist, corrupt and avowedly Federalist administration of the elder President
Adams. (Perhaps fortunately, Jackson was
unaware that JeÖerson may actually have

2 “An act for the better regulation and government of free negroes and persons of colored, and for
other purposes,” 1822 S.C. Acts chap. 3 § 3. I follow the convention adopted in the published
attorney general opinions and refer to the South Carolina act as “the Police Bill.”
3 See Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (No. 4355) (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (Police Bill violates exclusive
federal powers and the supremacy clause); Validity of the South Carolina Police Bill, 1 Op. Att’y
Gen. 659 (1824) (same); Validity of the South Carolina Police Bill, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 426 (1831)
(Police Bill constitutional and consistent with the commercial treaty).
4 See Carl Brent Swisher, Roger B. Taney 152-53 (1936). Swisher thought it likely that the opinion’s
contents seemed too controversial.
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thought him a violent military man personally
unÕt for the presidency.)5
Jackson’s problem was that JeÖerson’s very
success in defeating and ultimately destroying the Federalists had turned JeÖersonian
Republicanism into an all-embracing tent in
which virtually all national politics found a
home in the 1820s. Jackson therefore
numbered among his supporters advocates of
widely divergent and often contradictory
policies, and the task of conducting his
administration according to consistent principles without alienating important parts of his
Democratic party was a diÓcult, and at times
impossible, task. He was deeply suspicious of
banks, and eventually developed a visceral
hatred for the second Bank of the United
States, but many of his close allies (including
most of his cabinet after April 1831) supported the Bank. As a JeÖersonian, Jackson
was rhetorically committed to a small federal
government and to a “states rights” interpretation of the Constitution, but JeÖersonianism had long before developed a strain of
optimistic nationalism that was as much at
war with doctrinaire anti-nationalism as
Federalism had ever been. Friend and foe
alike saw Jackson as an opponent of any form
of aristocracy, and his election as the triumph
of the People (or the mob), but any administration that depended for its survival on the
votes of urban industrial workers, Deep
South planters and Western frontiersmen
could not but Õnd it diÓcult at times to
decide what popular democracy should mean
in practice.
Roger Brooke Taney was not originally a

JeÖersonian at all: his father Michael was a
member of the predominantly Federalist
Maryland gentry and as a young man Taney
was active in Federalist party politics. But
neither Michael nor Roger was inclined to
follow blindly a party line, and the younger
Taney in particular held a mix of opinions
not all of which would have been congenial
to Alexander Hamilton. The Taney family
blamed banks, and the mercantile interests
with which banks were intimately associated,
for their economic woes, and Taney’s political experience and legal practice alike fostered
in him a dislike of the Bank of the United
States akin in its vehemence to Jackson’s.6
Like many other Federalists in an era of
Republican domination of the national
government, Taney came to hold quite unHamiltonian views on the sovereignty of the
states, but (once again like Jackson) in the
1820s and 30s Taney distinguished allegiance
to states rights from opposition to the
Union. Indeed, he later attributed his detachment from the Federalist party to New
England Federalism’s Ôirtation with disloyalty during the War of 1812.
For while the enemy was in the midst of us
[Marylanders] assailing our cities, and burning
our houses, and plundering our property, and
the citizens of the State, without distinction of
party, were putting forth their whole strength
and blending in its defence, those with whom
the Maryland Federalists had been associated
as political friends in the Eastern States, and
whom they had regarded and treated as the
leaders of the party, were holding the Hartford
Convention, talking about disunion … . They
were moreover using every exertion in their

5 This description of Jackson and the challenges his administration faced is drawn chieÔy from Robert
Remini’s magisterial biography of Jackson. See Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of
American Freedom 1822-1832, at 156-202, 230-56 (1981). Volumes two and three of the Remini
biography contain chronologies of the events in Jackson’s life on which I have relied in subsequent
paragraphs of this introduction. Dumas Malone discusses JeÖerson’s view of Jackson in Malone, The
Sage of Monticello 436-37 (1981).
6 See Walter Lewis, Without Fear or Favor: A Biography of Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney 89
(1965).
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power to destroy the credit and cripple the
resources of the general Government, feeble as
it then was, and leaving us to defend ourselves
as well as we could by our own resources.
It will readily be imagined that after this the
Federalists of Maryland would hardly desire to
continue the party association … .7

When the 1824 election generated a presidential contest among four (Õve until John C.
Calhoun dropped out to become the successful vice presidential candidate) Republican
claimants to the legacy of JeÖerson, Taney at
Õrst took a rather detached view: he was “a
good deal inclined to go with … Old Hickory”
because he thought Jackson “is honest … is
independent, is not brought forward by any
particular class of politicians, or any sectional
interest,” although he showed a noticeable lack
of enthusiasm about Jackson.8 This soon
changed, with the publication, in May 1824, of
correspondence Jackson had exchanged with
James Monroe in 1816 and 1817, in which
Jackson denounced the Hartford Conventioneers as a “kind of men, although called
Federalists, are really monarchists, and traitors
to the constituted authorities”: “had I commanded the military department where the
Hartford Convention met, if it had been the
last act of my life, I should have punished the
three principal leaders of that party.” Jackson’s
denunciation of the very group that had

alienated Taney from his political roots, and
no doubt Old Hickory’s comment in the same
letter that “there are men called Federalists
that are honest and virtuous,” sealed Taney’s
transformation into a Jacksonian Democrat.9
By 1828, Taney was one of the two or three
premier members of the Maryland bar, attorney general of the state, and General Jackson’s
leading supporter in the state – Taney served
as chairman of the Jackson Central Committee
during the election. Although after consideration Taney was initially passed over for
federal attorney general in 1829, in the spring of
1831 Jackson approached him through his
brother-in-law, Francis Scott Key. The occasion stemmed from Old Hickory’s successive
decisions earlier in the year publicly to drive
Vice President Calhoun out of the Democratic
party and then to replace virtually his entire
cabinet, in both cases because Jackson had
concluded that his administration had suÖered
from the disloyalty and misconduct of his
subordinates.10 After an exchange of letters in
which Key assured Taney that Jackson had a
high view of his abilities and opinions, Taney
agreed to become attorney general, and took
oÓce in July 1831. Within a month, Secretary of
State Livingston (responding to renewed British protests over South Carolina’s interference
with British seamen), asked Taney for his
opinion on the validity of the South Carolina
Police Bill. Taney declined to reply at Õrst,

7 Taney, Memorandum (n.d.), quoted in Samuel Tyler, Memoir of Roger Brooke Taney, LL.D. 158-59
(1872).
8 “Jackson is not indeed the man I would name for President, if it rested with me to choose from the
whole United States.” This quotation and the ones in the text are from Taney’s letter to William M.
Beall (Apr. 13, 1824), quoted in Swisher, Roger B. Taney, at 121.
9 Jackson, Letter to Monroe ( Jan. 6, 1817), 2 Correspondence of Andrew Jackson 272-73 ( John Bassett
ed. 1929); Remini, Course of American Freedom, at 71-73; Tyler, Memoir, at 158. For the rest of the
correspondence, see Jackson, Letter to Monroe (Oct. 13, 1816), Jackson, Letter to Monroe (Nov. 12,
1816), and Monroe, Letter to Jackson (Dec. 14, 1816), in 2 Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, at
261, 263, 266.
10 Jackson’s anger at Calhoun was largely personal, based on his discovery that Calhoun had misled
him about his opinions of Jackson when Calhoun was Secretary of War and Jackson a general in the
U.S. Army during Monroe’s administration. On the changes in the cabinet, see Remini, Course of
American Freedom, at 301-20.
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possibly because any answer was politically
risky.11 For whatever reason, Taney temporized
until November 1831, when another inquiry
from Secretary Livingston posed a diÖerent
question about American federalism and the
treaty with Britain.
Livingston’s new issue, posed him by a
Philadelphia merchant, was whether the treaty
guaranteed British West Indian slaveowners’
property rights in slaves serving as mariners on
British vessels stopping at American ports in
free states, some of which had laws freeing
slaves introduced into the state in deÕance of
state law. In an opinion dated December 6, 1831,
Taney replied that since an American master
could not assert property rights over a slave
introduced into England (Taney’s language
makes it clear he had Lord MansÕeld’s famous
decision in Somerset’s Case (1772) in mind), the
treaty could not reasonably be construed to
interfere with the free state laws in question.12
Taney’s December opinion is sometimes seen
as a clever maneuver by which the Attorney
General was able to indicate his pro-South
Carolina views on that state’s controversial act
without the burden and risk of doing so
expressly.13 If so, Taney was unsuccessful:
North Carolina’s enforcement of a law parallel
to the South Carolina Police Bill prompted
renewed demands by the British chargé
d’aÖaires in Washington that the federal
government take action to see that states with
such laws “repeal their obnoxious enactments”
at once.14 This time, Taney took the bull by the
horns.

The problem(s) of opining on
the Police Bill
As with many other controversies that plagued
the Jackson administration, the question
Livingston posed Taney was tightly, and
confusingly, interwoven with many others. In
his 1823 decision on circuit, Justice Johnson had
concluded that the South Carolina Police Bill
was clearly unconstitutional: indeed, he
thought its “utter incompatibility with the
power delegated to congress to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and our sister
states” was so clear “that it will not bear
argument.” Johnson also concluded that the
law was “an express infraction of the treaty”
with Great Britain and thus invalid under the
supremacy clause. In response to the argument
that the power to regulate the entry of persons
of color was necessary to a slave state’s internal
safety, and thus was constitutionally reserved
to the states, Johnson exploded.
Where is this to land us? Is it not asserting the
right in each state to throw oÖ the federal constitution at its will and pleasure? If it can be
done as to any particular article it may be done
as to all; and, like the old confederation, the
Union becomes a mere rope of sand.

Taking such a position, Johnson warned his
fellow South Carolinians, “necessarily compromits the public peace, and tends to embroil
us with, if not separate us from, our sister
states; in short … it leads to a dissolution of
the Union, and implies a direct attack upon

11 In his May 28, 1832, opinion, Taney referred to “the circumstances which were supposed to render it
unnecessary to reply to [Livingston’s] letter of August last,” although I do not know what those
circumstances were. I discuss the political and constitutional diÓculties Taney faced shortly. One of
Taney’s biographers suggested that Taney was also concerned about addressing an issue involving
slave state control over people of color because of the Nat Turner rebellion, which had just taken
place and raised white Southern fears to a fever pitch. Swisher, Roger B. Taney, at 147-49.
12 Slaves on British Vessels Trading to United States, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 475, 476-77 (1831).
13 See Swisher, Roger B. Taney, at 149-51; Marvin L. Winitsky, The Jurisprudence of Roger B. Taney
89-91 (ucla Ph. D. dissertation 1973).
14 Charles Bankhead, Letter to Edward Livingston (May 14, 1832), quoted in Swisher, Roger B. Taney,
at 151.
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the sovereignty of the United States.”15
Strong words, and unpleasantly relevant to
the situation in which Taney found himself, for
the validity of the South Carolina Police Bill
came up in middle of a potentially even graver
confrontation between federal prerogatives
and state power: the nulliÕcation crisis. In 1828,
before Jackson’s election as the states rights
candidate for president, Congress enacted a
protective tariÖ that many Southerners
thought unfair and inequitable because it
protected Northeastern industry at the
expense of the agricultural South. By February
1829, on the eve of Jackson’s inauguration, Õve
Southern state legislatures had adopted
resolutions formally protesting the “tariÖ of
abominations.” South Carolina, however, had
gone further: along with resolutions of protest,
its legislature had printed and distributed a
document, secretly drafted by Vice President
Calhoun, which asserted that the tariÖ was
unconstitutional, and that the state could, if it
chose, nullify the federal law within its borders.
Eager not to eliminate himself as a contender
for president, Calhoun played both sides of the
issue as long as he could by publicly refusing to
take a position on nulliÕcation, but his options
had become diminishingly small by mid-1831:
purged from the national Democratic Party by
Old Hickory, he found himself in danger of
alienating his political base at home by further
equivocation. On August 3, he published over
his own name a speech, the Fort Hill Address,
which forthrightly asserted the power of
nulliÕcation (or “state interposition” as he
preferred to call it).16
Old Hickory’s opinion of nulliÕcation and
nulliÕers was isomorphic with his wish that he

could have hung the leaders of the Hartford
Convention: deÕance of federal law was simply
treason to the Union. In Jackson’s mind this did
not contradict his commitment to states rights.
“I draw a wide diÖerence between State Rights
and the advocates of them, and a nulliÕer. One
will preserve the union of the States. The other
will dissolve the union by destroying the
constitution by acts unauthorized in it.”17 But
this distinction, however clear it might be to
the president, was a complicated one to apply
in practice. Taney’s predecessor as attorney
general, John McPherson Berrien, had given
the president an opinion on the South
Carolina Police Bill in the spring of 1831 which
concluded that, contrary to the views expressed
earlier by Johnson and Wirt, the Police Bill did
not contravene the treaty with Britain. The
conclusion was a useful one, in that it avoided
any necessity to take action that would further
inÔame South Carolina opinion, but Berrien’s
strained reasoning reÔected the diÓculty of
reconciling the nationalist and the localist
themes in the president’s world view. The
congressional power over foreign commerce is
exclusive, Berrien wrote (agreeing with
Johnson and Wirt), and the Police Bill (obviously) aÖects foreign commerce. At the same
time, “the power to regulate their own internal
police” is “clearly reserved to the respective
States,” and the federal government “cannot
control the exercise of this reserved power,”
unless, that is, doing so is necessary “to the
eÓcient exercise of the commercial power.” On
the question of who decides constitutional disputes, one which the controversy over nulliÕcation had brought to the forefront (not that it is
ever far from center stage in constitutional

15 Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 494-96 (No. 4355) (C.C.D.S.C. 1823). Attorney General Wirt’s
1824 opinion came to the same conclusion, in somewhat less Ôamboyant language. See Validity of
the South Carolina Police Bill, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 659, 660-61 (1824). Both Johnson and Wirt believed
the Police Bill in conÔict with various federal statutes governing navigation as well.
16 See Merrill D. Peterson, The Great Triumvirate 189-94 (1987).
17 Jackson, Letter to Robert Y. Hayne (Feb. 6, 1831), quoted in Remini, Course of American Freedom,
at 332-33.
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law), Berrien informed Jackson that “the legislature of South Carolina is the exclusive judge
of th[e] necessity” of legislation such as the
Police Bill, “except where the operation of the
act may interfere with rights existing under the
commercial laws or conventions of the United
States.”18
It is doubtful that either nulliÕers or
nationalists would have been satisÕed with this
exercise in giving with one hand and taking
with the other, and Berrien himself eventually
worked his way around to answering Jackson’s
question by denying that the South Carolina
Police Bill violated the treaty at all. The treaty’s
guarantee to British vessels of free and secure
entry into American ports was expressly made
subject to the laws of the United States and an
1803 federal statute had forbidden ship captains
from bringing persons of color into any port in
violation of state law. South Carolina’s law, in
other words, was valid because Congress had
exercised its (exclusive) power over commerce
to make it so. Berrien was able to reach this
happy conclusion only by ignoring Chief
Justice John Marshall, to be sure – in 1820
Marshall held on circuit that Congress did not
intend its statute to apply to mariners19 – but
although that might not have troubled Jackson
unduly had he known it, Berrien’s opinion
clearly was not seen as settling the issue.
Secretary Livingston’s request for an opinion on the South Carolina Police Bill intersected with a second major controversy in
which the administration was embroiled – the
Bank of the United States. Jackson’s dislike of
the Bank was public knowledge: in his Õrst
annual message to Congress, in December
1829, he had reminded the legislature that the

Bank’s charter would expire in 1836, and that it
was not too soon to begin considering the
long-standing JeÖersonian objections to the
constitutionality of a national bank as well as
what Jackson called the Bank’s complete
failure “in the great end of establishing a
uniform and sound currency.” Jackson’s annual
message the following year was even sharper,
and put the policy objections to the Bank in
terms closer to the president’s private conviction that the Bank was a corrupt and corrupting political monster. “Nothing has occurred
to lessen in any degree the danger which many
of our citizens apprehend from that institution as at present organized.” However, in 1830
as in 1829, Jackson did not call overtly for the
elimination of a national bank altogether, but
only suggested its reform so “as to obviate
constitutional and other objections.”20 By the
time Jackson reconstituted his cabinet in April
1831, however, he had no remaining personal
hesitations about the need for a radical
solution. As the General explained to an old
friend, “the great task of Democratic reform in
the administration of our Government”
required a militant “struggle against the
rechartering of the U. States Bank … . The
corrupting inÔuence of the Bank upon the
morals of the people and upon Congress are to
be met and fearlessly met.”21 Nevertheless, the
administration’s public position remained
ambiguous: the president’s third annual
address in December 1831 stated that he
“[e]ntertain[ed] the opinions heretofore
expressed in relation to the Bank of the
United States as at present organized,” but a
day later, with Jackson’s permission, Secretary
of the Treasury Louis McLane issued a report

18 Validity of the South Carolina Police Bill, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 426, 435-38 (1831).
19 The Wilson v. United States, 30 F. Cas. 239 (C.C.D.Va. 1820).
20 Jackson, First Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 8, 1829), 2 James D. Richardson, Messages and
Papers of the Presidents 1025 (1897); Jackson, Second Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 6, 1830),
id. at 1091-92.
21 Jackson, Letter to Hugh Lawson White (Apr. 29, 1831), in 4 Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, at
272.
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supporting recharter of the Bank on condition
that its Õnancial structure was radically
restructured.22
Unlike Secretary McLane, the new Attorney General was an absolute opponent of the
Bank, and a considerable amount of Taney’s
energy in his Õrst year in oÓce was spent in
what amounted to an intra-cabinet Õght with
McLane and Taney over what public position
the president would eventually endorse. In
early January 1832, Taney’s position was greatly,
if inadvertently, strengthened when the Bank
petitioned Congress, four years early, for a
renewal of its charter. This act stiÖened Old
Hickory’s determination to destroy the
monster, but many issues remained unsettled,
some of them of a constitutional nature. If
Congress passed a renewal bill, would it be
legitimate for the president to veto it on constitutional grounds, particularly in light of the
Supreme Court’s 1819 decision in M’Culloch v.
Maryland upholding the Bank against constitutional challenge? Even if Jackson did not want
to be bound by M’Culloch’s holding on the
Bank, it must have been quite unclear that the
president would welcome a repudiation of
M’Culloch’s attack on state sovereignty and
reserved powers reasoning, given his deep
devotion to the Union and to national authority (and in light of the ongoing nulliÕcation
controversy).
Behind Jacksonian-era debates over tariÖs,
nulliÕcation, the power of Congress to charter
a national bank, and the validity of state police
laws aÖecting commerce was, of course, the
issue of slavery. From the beginning, the
defenders of slavery had recognized that a
national government vested with extensive
powers could pose a threat to the institution
when and if a national political majority
wished it to do so. That time had not arrived
in Andrew Jackson’s Õrst term, but the implications for the preservation of slavery of any

position he took on the South Carolina Police
Bill would not have escaped the Attorney
General.

II. The Documents
There are three documents preserved in the
Carl Brent Swisher Collection of Research
Material on Roger B. Taney (Box 21), in the
Manuscript Division of the Library of
Congress.
(1) A draft of the main opinion, of May 28,
1832, in Taney’s own handwriting, with many
deletions, corrections, and additions, also in
Taney’s hand.
(2) Taney’s handwritten cover letter of June 9,
1832, to Secretary of State Livingston.
(3) A draft of the supplement to his main
opinion that Taney sent Livingston on June 9.
This document is in a much neater secretarial
hand, with some corrections and additions by
Taney himself.

The draft of the main opinion is by far the
most diÓcult document to read and edit, due
in part to Taney’s at times hurried handwriting,
and in part to the occasional uncertainty that
the draft’s many changes create. In two places,
Taney crossed out substantial passages: these I
have removed to footnotes with an indication
in the text of where the passages stand in the
manuscript. In Õve instances, Taney wrote
substantial additional passages after he
completed the draft; these I have inserted in the
text at the places Taney indicated; pointing
Õngers numbered in accordance with Taney’s
original indicate the beginning (#!) and end
("#) of each insertion. As with most antebellum writers, Taney’s use of capitalization and
punctuation conforms to no modern system,
and indeed appears to be somewhat random. I
have omitted without indication many dashes
that we would now consider superÔuous, e.g.,

22 See Remini, Course of American Freedom, at 336-40.
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after a period, and have retained Taney’s erratic
use of capital letters. Words I have supplied for
reasons of syntax or meaning are enclosed in

[square brackets]. Words in the text that Taney
did not strike but which appear to be clearly
superÔuous are enclosed in {braces}.


The main opinion
Attorney General’s OÓce
May 28, 1832
You are aware of the circumstances which were
supposed to render it unnecessary to reply to
your letter of August last, in which you
requested my opinion on the constitutionality
of the act of assembly of South Carolina
relative to free people of colour coming into
that State on board of a merchant vessel. The
renewed application on this subject from the
Charge D’AÖaires of Great Britain which
occasioned your note to me of the 19th inst,
seems to render any further delay inexpedient
& requires the government to come to a
deÕnite conclusion on the subject. I proceed
therefore to express my opinion [on the]
question you have proposed to me.
So far as the British government is
concerned I think the answer is obvious and
satisfactory. They are allowed by the Treaty
freely and securely to come with their ships &
cargoes & to remain & reside in any part of
the territory where other foreigners are
permitted to reside – but this permission is in
express terms made subject to the laws and
statutes of the country. The act of assembly in
question has been passed by the proper Legislative body of South Carolina. It has been
hitherto regarded and obeyed, as a law not
only by the people of that state, but by the
citizens of every state of the Union. No judicial tribunal of competent authority has
pronounced the law to be unconstitutional.
Here then is a law which has been enacted by
the regular legislative power of the place,
which has been submitted to by the citizens

of the United States & recognized & obeyed
by them as valid and obligatory. While it is
thus acknowledged and enforced as a law
upon our own citizens & has not been
declared void by any judicial decision, can a
foreign nation be allowed to call its validity
into question upon the ground that it is
contrary to our own Constitution? I think
not. Any enactment by a regular legislative
body which is received and obeyed by the
people of the U. States as a law, must be so
treated and acknowledged by {this} every
foreign nation – and no foreign government
can be allowed in its negotiations with the U.
States to question the interpretation given to
the constitution of the U. States by our own
people & our own proper authorities. The
British Government therefore have no right to
complain of this act on the ground that it is
unconstitutional. And if they are bound to
regard it as a law of the place they cannot
complain of it as an infraction of the Treaty.
The right to trade is expressly by the treaty
itself made subject to the laws of the place. If
any individual British subject is unwilling to
submit to this law, & supposes it to be unconstitutional and void it is in his power to bring
the subject before the judicial tribunals of the
country for decision. But surely the British
Government have no right to ask for its
subjects an exemption from the operation of
the municipal laws of a state which are
enforced against the citizens of the other
states of the Union. No fair interpretation of
the Treaty can lead us so to construe it so as
[to] entitle the coloured subjects of Great
Britain or British merchant vessels & mariners to greater privileges in Charleston than
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are allowed to the coloured citizens of Massachusetts or to merchant vessels & mariners
from that state. This view of this subject
appears to me to be a suÓcient & satisfactory
answer to this complaint preferred by the
British Charge d’aÖaires & renders it
unnecessary to enter into any discussion with
him upon the constitutionality of the law in
question.
But as this point is one of much interest &
delicacy and I have formed my opinion upon
it, it will perhaps be more agreeable to you
that I should state it now rather than reserve it
for a future occasion.
My two immediate predecessors in the oÓce
of attorney general of the U. States have as you
know diÖered in opinion on this question. It
cannot therefore be regarded as a settled point.
Nor free from diÓculty. And it is impossible to
foresee how it may ultimately be decided in the
Supreme Court. But in my opinion South
Carolina or any other slaveholding state has a
right to guard itself from the danger to be
apprehended from the introduction of free
people of colour among their slaves – and have
not by the constitution of the U.S. surrendered
the right to pass the laws necessary for that
purpose. I think this right is reserved to the
states & cannot be abrogated by the U. States
either by legislation or by treaty. And if by a fair
construction of the Treaty with England it
came in conÔict with the law of South Carolina
it does not by any means follow that the law
must yield to it. The Constitution it is true has
declared that a Treaty shall be the supreme law.
But in order to make it so the stipulations must
be within the Treaty making power. A Treaty
would be void which interfered with the powers expressly delegated to Congress. So it
would be void if it came in conÔict with rights
reserved to the states. 1! For example if it
ceded a portion of her acknowledged territory
without her consent – or stipulated that she
should adopt a particular form of government
inconsistent with the wishes of the people of

84

the State, it is very clear that such stipulations
would be void & would not be the supreme law
in the state whose rights it invaded. And the
same may be said of any other provision in a
treaty which comes in collision with a right
reserved to the state. "1 And altho the
nonfulÕllment of such a Treaty would give just
ground of complaint to the other party & the
U. States would be bound to make reparation
for the breach of it, yet it would not be the
supreme law here & could not lawfully be
carried into execution by the Government of
the U. States. If therefore the Treaty were
susceptible of the interpretation claimed for it
by the British Government, still it could not be
enforced if South Carolina had a right to
prohibit the introduction of free people of
colour within her limits.
I have said that in my opinion South Carolina has the right to prohibit the introduction
of free people of colour within her limits. She
had unquestionably power to do so before the
adoption of the Federal constitution. By what
article has she surrendered it? In what article
can the slave holding states who assisted in
forming the constitution and who afterwards
adopted it be supposed to have contemplated
the relinquishment of this power? The words
ought to be clear & express or the implication
necessary & unavoidable which should lead us
to such a conclusion. For we have every reason
to believe that if the proposition had been
distinctly made to them, they would as soon
have surrendered their own lives as parted from
a power absolutely necessary for their own
safety. And I cannot think that any general
terms or ambiguous phrases in such an instrument as the Federal constitution can justiÕably
be expounded to mean what we are perfectly
sure from the situation of the parties to the
compact & from their habits & feelings, they
could not & did not intend.
The African race in the United States even
when free, are every where a degraded class – &
exercise no political inÔuence. The privileges
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they are allowed to enjoy, are accorded to them
as a matter of kindness & benevolence rather
than of right. They are the only class of persons
who can be held as mere property – as slaves.
And where they are nominally admitted by law
to the privileges of citizenship, they have no
eÖectual power to defend them, & are permitted to be citizens by the suÖerance of the white
population & hold whatever rights they enjoy
at their mercy. They were never regarded as a
constituent portion of the sovereignty of any
state. But as a separate and degraded people to
whom the sovereignty of each state might
accord or withhold such privileges as they
deemed proper. They were not looked upon as
citizens by the contracting parties who formed
the constitution. They were evidently not
supposed to be included by the term citizens.
And have not been intended to be embraced in
any of the provisions of that constitution but
those which point to them in terms not to be
mistaken.
This view of the subject is illustrated by that
article of the constitution which gives to citizens
of each State the “privileges & immunities of
citizens in the several States.[”] Was this
intended to include the coloured race? Did the
slave holding states when they adopted the
constitution intend to give within their own
limits to a free coloured person residing in
Massachusetts or Connecticut all the rights
and privileges which they allowed to the white
citizens of those states? The article has never
been so construed. A white citizen from either
of these states has a right under the
constitution to come into a slave holding state
whenever he pleases. He has a right to remain
as long as he thinks proper – and while he
continues there he is entitled to the same
protection from the laws & the same legal
presumptions in his favour as the citizen of the
state; & he may if he chooses keep arms in his
house or room for his defense or carry them
about him. But this is not the case with the
coloured population. Every slave holding State

it is believed has prohibited their migration &
settlement within their limits, and in the
absence of evidence of their freedom presumes
them to be slaves & subjects them to imprisonment without any oÖence being charged
against them – and has forbidden all persons of
that colour from keeping or carrying arms. Did
the slaveholding states mean to surrender their
right to enact such Laws? It is impossible to
imagine they could have so intended, and the
uniform course of their legislation since the
adoption of the Federal Constitution shows
that they did not so understand that instrument. The slave holding states could not have
surrendered this power, without bringing upon
themselves inevitably the evils of insurrection
& rebellion among their slaves, & the non slave
holding states could have no inducement to
desire its surrender. 2! On the contrary as
members of the union & interested in promoting the common welfare, they had every reason
to wish that the slave holding states should
retain a power which is obviously essential to
their safety, & necessary to the preservation of
peace & order within their limits. "2
We are therefore irresistibly led to the
conclusion, that when they were stipulating in
the constitution, about the rights which the
citizens of each state should enjoy in the other
states, none of the parties to the compact
contemplated the African race & did not
design or desire to deprive each other of the
absolute & unlimited power of Legislation so
far as regarded them. Our constitutions were
not formed by the assistance of that
unfortunate race nor for their beneÕt. They
were not regarded as constituent members of
either of the sovereignties & were not
therefore intended to be embraced by the
terms citizens of each State. If they cannot be
considered as included in this speciÕc stipulation, (which would perhaps embrace them if a
technical and literal interpretation were given
to the words used, regardless of the plain
object & intention of the parties) how can
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they be supposed to have been in the
contemplation of the parties when general
terms are used in the constitution upon other
subjects? How can the states be supposed to
have intended to surrender or limit their right
of Legislation over this description of people
by the general Terms in which they have
granted the power to regulate commerce and
to make Treaties? And if by a fair & just
construction of the constitution according to
its obvious spirit and meaning they did not
mean to surrender or limit their own power on
this subject by the grant of the Treaty making
power or any other general power to the
Federal Government, then the absolute and
unlimited right to Legislate over them in as

full and ample a measure as they possessed it
before the constitution was formed, was
reserved to the States, & the law of South
Carolina in that case is valid even if the Treaty
contained an express stipulation to the
contrary.23
3! Indeed independent of the principle
which requires us in the present state of things
to regard the law of South Carolina as a good
and valid one the considerations just stated are
suÓcient to show that by a fair and just interpretation of the treaty it cannot be construed
to embrace the coloured subjects of Great
Britain & give to them the right of entry &
trade & residence etc mentioned in the Õrst
article. Great Britain is not only aware of the

23 At this point, Taney crossed out the following material from his original text.
This consideration above stated in relation to the word citizen in our constitution appear[s]
to me also to shew, that if the word “subjects” of Great Britain used in the treaty, would in its
most extended & general meaning include persons of the African races who are subjects of his
majesty, yet this word cannot be regarded as having been used in that extensive sense by the
parties to the contract. That unfortunate people came into the dominions of Great Britain not
as aliens coming to settle among them & whose descendants would be free born British
subjects, but as slaves; whose posterity it was then intended should always {to} remain so.
The privileges there granted to some of them, are rather favors than rights inherent in British
subjects, & they are there as here a distinct & degraded race. They are not intended to be
included when the British people or British subjects are spoken of – And as this is their
situation in Great Britain – & they were bound to know and did actually know the light in
which they were regarded here they had no right to suppose that the U. States designed to
include them in the general terms used in the Treaty & if they desired or intended to make a
stipulation in relation to them, it ought to have been proposed {it} in speciÕc terms. They
cannot justly claim for the words used a meaning & construction which they were bound to
know the U. States did not & could not intend they should bear.
But what appears to me to show conclusively that the parties did not use the word
“subjects” in the sense now contended for by G. Britain is that the article in question would
not be reciprocal according [to] that interpretation. The slaves in the British West India
islands are subjects of Great Britain according to the most extensive meaning of that word.
The slaves in the U. States are in no sense of the word ‘citizens’ and if the construction
claimed by them is admitted they would have rights for their slaves in our ports, which they
have not granted to our slaves in theirs. This could not have been the intention of the parties
to the Treaty – and it shows that the word “subjects” was used in a restricted sense & not in its
most enlarged one – and if it is construed to have been used in a restricted sense, it ought to
be restrained to its ordinary & familiar meaning by which this peculiar race would not be
included. They have never been looked to or considered as forming any part of the body
politic either in this country or Great Britain.
In this view of the Treaty the British Government would have no right to complain even if
the Government of the U. States had the undoubted authority to make and execute such an
engagement. The persons to whom the wrong is supposed to be done are not & were not
intended to be embraced in the Treaty.

86

5 Green Bag 2d 75

v5n1.book Page 87 Monday, September 24, 2001 12:15 AM

Attorney General Taney  the South Carolina Police Bill
condition of the African race in the U. States
but that unhappy people hold in her own
dominions the same relation to the white
population that they hold in this country. In
both nations the great body of them are
doomed to slavery & the number that are
admitted to the privileges of freedom form but
a small proportion. In both countries therefore the African race are generally spoken of &
regarded as slaves who form no part of the
body politic. They ought not therefore to be
considered as embraced in any general
stipulations made by treaty in favour of the
people of the two nations. We never contemplate the British nation as in part made up of
the African race, nor do they so regard the
people of this country. They had therefore no
right to suppose that the few emancipated
coloured persons, who form an exception to
the general character and legal condition of
the race, were intended to be included in any
general provisions made in favor of the people
of the two countries. And if they desired to
include their emancipated coloured population they ought to have brought them into
view in the negotiation [and] required a
speciÕc provision on the subject. The Treaty is
to be expounded according to the real meaning of the parties & a literal interpretation at
war with the obvious intention ought not to
be given to it. And I am persuaded that no one
can believe that either those who negotiated
the treaty or ratiÕed it, thought at the time of
the few coloured persons who enjoy a sort of
degraded freedom, as a portion of the people
of either country. "3
It may be said however that the law of S.
Carolina is more severe and oppressive than is
necessary for its own protection. Upon examining its provisions I am ready to admit that
milder measures would I think have secured
the object and would have created less dissatisfaction. But if a state has reserved the power to
guard itself from the danger to be apprehended
from the introduction of free people of colour

among them, it appears to me that such a
reservation carries with it the right to judge the
means required to accomplish eÖectually the
purpose. What means are suÓcient must of
necessity be a question of Legislative
discretion. It may like any other power where
discretion is to be exercised in the mode of
carrying it into execution, be oppressively
exercised and thereby abused. The power for
example of regulating commerce plainly gives
to Congress the right to impose a tariÖ for the
protection of domestic industry. This power
may be oppressively exercised so as to throw an
unjust & unequal burthen on one portion {of }
in order to enrich another. Yet the law would I
apprehend be constitutional & valid – & every
body bound to obey it – because the constitution has given the power and left the mode of
exercising it to the discretion of Congress. So a
Judge having a discretion to inÔict a greater or
lesser punishment for a certain oÖence, might
when there were many mitigating circumstances and the punishment ought to be the
lightest oppressively inÔict the heaviest in his
power. Yet the sentence would be a legal one &
those who are subject to the authority of the
Court would not only be justiÕed in obeying
the judgment but would be bound to carry it
into execution. And whenever a discretion is
given the tribunal which is to exercise it must
judge of the manner & extent to which it is to
be used. In this case what tribunal could
constitutionally decide that less oppressive
means would guard the state from the evil she
apprehends? The courts could not do it –
because a judicial tribunal cannot revise a
matter of legislative discretion, & point out to
the legislature the manner in which it shall
carry into eÖect a power which it is admitted to
possess.
4! This point was distinctly decided by the
Supreme Court in the case of McCulloch vs.
The State of Maryland & that case turned
upon it. Indeed the principle is an obvious one
& founded in the nature of judicial power. For
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if it undertook to review the exercise of
legislative discretion, it must itself exercise a
legislative function & not a judicial one. And it
is immaterial whether the legislative discretion
be vested in a state or the U. States, it is equally
from the nature of the power beyond all judicial
control.
It may be asked what is to be done where
a legislature abuses it[s] power & exercises it
for the purposes of oppression or for any
other purpose than the one for which it was
given? Is such a case without remedy? I
answer no. The remedy is in the people who
elect the body & the responsibility of the
representative is, in this respect, in his
constituents. The power & the discretion is
given, & there is no other tribunal but that
of the people which can call them to account
for the exercise of a power committed to
their hands. In passing a law forbidden by
the constitution they exercise a power not
conferred on them & hence the judicial
tribunals are not bound by it & may declare
it void. But it is a very diÖerent case when
they abuse a power actually conferred on
them & from error or improper motives
enact laws needlessly oppressive.24
This question must not be confounded
with another class of cases where the general &
state governments have both a right to legislate
over the same subject & the laws passed by
them respectively come in collision with each
other. In cases of that description the Supreme
Court have said that the law of the State is void
so far as it conÔicts with the law of Congress.

Such a case is one clearly for judicial decision.
Because neither Legislature transcends the
power given to it, and the court being authorized to interpret the law of congress & to
carry it into eÖect it necessarily becomes a
question for them to decide whether a state
law standing in its way can limit its operation.
So as to the Treaty making power. If the right
was conferred on the General Government to
restrain the power of the States over the people
of colour within their respective territories and
stipulations were contained in a Treaty which
came in collision with State laws on that
subject, the state laws must yield to & the
Treaty would prevail. But in my view of the
subject there is no power conferred by the
constitution on the U. States, to restrict either
by Legislation or Treaty the absolute & unlimited power of legislation by the several states in
relation to people of colour coming within
their limits. The reasons which lead me to that
conclusion have been already stated. And
regarding the matter in that light, if the
provisions of the treaty were at war with those
of the act of S. Carolina, it would not be a case
of powers admitted to be possessed on both
sides coming in their exercise, into conÔict
with one another, but would be an exercise of
power by the U. States not given by the constitution – and the stipulations in the treaty
would be inoperative & void and would not
impede or limit the operation of the law of the
state. This case therefore cannot be subjected
to judicial examination & decision on the
ground of a conÔict between the State and

24 At this point, Taney crossed out the following material from his fourth note.
Thus as in the case before put of the TariÖ, it is very clear that the purpose for which it was
imposed – the motive which induced the Legislature to pass the law – is not a subject for judicial examination. It is a regulation of commerce & {have} the power to regulate it being given
by the constitution, the law is an exercise of constitutional power & no other tribunal but the
people of the U. States who elect the Legislative body can call them to account for it. No judicial tribunal & no state & no body of men but people of the U. States acting by their representatives can call them to account for it. Will it be said that this check is not suÓcient? I answer
what better can be provided? It is the only one that a representative Government can have &
to deny its suÓciency is to assert the unÕtness […]
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General Government, in the exercise of powers
possessed by both of them.
The Executive branch of the General
government certainly could not declare a state
law inoperative because a power reserved to the
states had been improperly or oppressively
exercised. If the law produced an inconvenience or embarrassment the President might
remonstrate with the state authorities & appeal
to their justice & patriotism to correct the evil
which improper legislation had produced. But
he could do nothing more. "4
There is no tribunal therefore competent to
decide that the law in question is null & void on
the ground that the power reserved to the state
has been oppressively exercised & that milder
measures would accomplish the same object.
The Legislature of the state is the only body to
which such an appeal can be made, and which
[is] competent to review & annul [that] which
has already been done. And there appears to be
no other tribunal known to our institutions,
which can constitutionally review its judgment
where the means to be employed are necessarily
matters of Legislative discretion.
5! Nor do I perceive that any great evil is
likely to arise from the exclusive control over
this subject which belongs to the states. Any
unnecessary embarrassment to trade &
commerce would be more injurious to the
people of the state which enacts the law than to
any other persons. It may therefore be safely
assumed that if error has been committed they
would on reconsideration correct it. There can
be no motive to pass laws which injure their
own commerce, or to produce inconveniences
in the case before me, beyond the bounds
which are absolutely necessary to make them
feel assured of their own safety. "5
While I express my own decided opinion
that the power to guard themselves on this
point is reserved to the states and cannot
therefore be controlled by the Treaty making
power, conferred on the General government, I am not insensible of the conÔicting

opinions entertained on the construction of
the constitution of the U. States, upon
questions which arise on the relative powers
of the states & of the Federal Government.
And I am aware that the Supreme Court of
the U. States have maintained doctrines on
this subject to which I cannot yield my
assent. And diÖering as I do most respectfully from that high Tribunal upon the rules
and principles by which the constitution of
the U. States ought to be construed, I am
aware that the opinion I have expressed may
not be sanctioned by that Court. Indeed
judging from the past I think it highly
probable that the Court will declare the law
of S. Carolina null & void if contrary to the
stipulations in the Treaty whenever the
question comes before it. And believing that
such is likely to be the case it is my duty to
apprise you of it. It is unnecessary now to say
what in that event ought to be done. But
whatever may be the force of the decision of
the Supreme Court in binding the parties
and settling their rights in the particular case
before them, I am not prepared to admit that
a construction given to the constitution by
the Supreme Court in deciding in any one or
more cases Õxes of itself irrevocably &
permanently its construction in that
particular & binds the states & the Legislative & executive branches of the General
Government, forever afterwards to conform
to it & adopt it in every other case as the
true reading of the instrument although all of
them may unite in believing it erroneous. If
the judgment pronounced by the court be
conclusive it does not follow that the reasoning or principles which it announces in
coming to its conclusions are equally binding
& obligatory. It will however be time enough
for the Executive to determine this point
when a case shall arise which compels it to
decide. The case before me as it now stands
does not call for a decision of this question. I
advert to it because it being my duty to state
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what I suppose may possibly be the decision
of the Supreme Court on the law of S.
Carolina it became necessary to explain why
I do not advise the Executive to adopt in
advance the construction which I think may
be given by the Court. I cannot regard it as
the true construction. And whatever may be
proper to be done if the Court should
hereafter declare the law in question to be
void, yet until that shall happen I am very
clear that it ought to be regarded by the
Executive as a valid law passed by competent

authority, & consequently a law which
according to the Treaty every subject of
Great Britain is bound to observe. The
British Government therefore have no right
to complain. The law is acknowledged and
submitted to as obligatory by our own
citizens, & there is nothing in the treaty
which gives them a right to be exempted
from the operation of any municipal law of
this country while it is admitted to be
binding on ourselves & obeyed by our own
citizens & enforced against them.


The supplement’s cover letter
June 9, 1832
My Dear Sir:
I send you a supplement to my Essay on the S.
Carolina law. You will see by the content of the
notes to what portion of the argument they
are intended to apply – As I have no copy of

what I before sent you, some things are probably repeated – And when I return from the
Maryland Court of Appeals I hope to have the
beneÕt of your notions on this subject and to
put the whole matter in proper form.
I am very respectfully yours
R.B. Taney


Taney’s supplement
note 1.
The African race has never been regarded
as a portion of the people of this country &
have never been considered as members of the
body politic. In our most solemn & public acts
where we speak of a people as our citizens they
are never intended to be included and this is so
well understood that it has not been deemed
necessary to qualify general principles or stipulations made in general terms in cases where
it is evident they were not intended to be
embraced.
Our Declaration of Independence we know
was drawn by a distinguished citizen of a slave
holding state. And when it was asserted in
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that instrument “that all men are created
equal; that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable rights; that among
these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights, governments
are instituted among men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed;” –
no one ever supposed that the African race in
this country were entitled to the beneÕt of this
declaration, nor did any one imagine that they
had a right to claim the extension of that great
principle to themselves. Yet the words are as
general in their import as the language of the
treaty which is said to include them.
note 2.
It may be said that the distinction I have
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taken between the exercise of a power not
granted by the Constitution & the abuse of a
power admitted to be given is not well founded.
And that if the Legislature of a state or the U.
States exercise a power which is given to it in an
oppressive manner or to accomplish objects
diÖerent from those which the constitution
contemplated – such acts must be unconstitutional & that the distinction taken is one of
words only. I think otherwise. But if I am
mistaken in this respect, it will not alter the
conclusion to which we must come. For the
true question in this case is can the judicial
power declare the law of South Carolina
unconstitutional and void? It matters not as to
this enquiry whether we call the law an abuse of
power or call it unconstitutional. In either case
it turns upon the exercise of Legislative
discretion, it does not rest with the judiciary to
revise it, and limit the bounds beyond which it
shall not pass. Legislative power is of necessity
an exercise of discretion. The power to exercise
a discretion cannot exist without the power of
abusing it. And when the Legislative body have
the power to attain a particular object, they
may use means, which while it attains that
object, are also intended to accomplish other
objects not committed to their care. But if they
are to attain a certain end, it follows always that
they must judge of the means, and a judicial
tribunal cannot revise their judgment and
decide that other means would be suÓcient &
more constitutional & proper. The case of
McCulloch vs. The State of Maryland before
referred to is an illustration of this principle.
That case is generally said to be a decision in
favor of the constitutionality of the present
Bank of the United States. I do not so
understand it. It is a decision that the judicial
power cannot revise such an act of Legislation
and declare it unconstitutional and void. And
in this view of the decision it is free from many
of the objections urged against it. The
principles on which the decision rests may be
summed up in a few words. The court say[s]

that under the power to lay & collect taxes & to
apply them to the objects contemplated by the
Constitution, the U. States must possess the
power to establish Õscal agents whenever it
pleases to eÖectuate the objects intended to be
accomplished – that this Õscal agent may be
either a single individual or a body of
individuals associated as a corporation; that the
Legislature must have the power of determining which is the better & more eÓcient
instrument & to select the one which in their
judgment is most likely to attain the object & it
must be a matter equally within their
discretion to decide with what powers and
faculties it is necessary to clothe this agent
whether the one preferred be an individual or a
corporation. But the court admit[s] that
Congress cannot confer on it any powers
forbidden to the U. States or in violation of
rights reserved to the several States, and insist
that within these limits it is purely a matter for
the Legislature to consider whether it shall be a
legal entity or a natural person & what powers
& faculties the public interest requires to be
given to it. And being subjects of Legislative
discretion the judiciary cannot revise their
decision & say that a natural person would be
better or that powers and faculties less comprehensive & dangerous would have been
suÓciently eÖectual to attain the end authorized by the constitution. If therefore it be true
that Congress may create a bank for the purposes of making it the agent of the government,
the judiciary could not on either of these
grounds above stated decide the law to be
unconstitutional. Before they could have come
to this conclusion, it would have been
necessary for them to look at the subject as
Legislators & to enter on the examinations &
reasonings & to take into consideration the
subjects which belong exclusively to Legislation and not to the judiciary. This it is evident
a court from the nature & character of its
functions cannot do & therefore it had not the
right to say that the law establishing the Bank
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was a violation of the constitution. But it does
not follow that this entire law was warranted by
the constitution. For example, if instead of
creating a corporation & clothing it with the
powers necessary for the Õscal operations of the
General Government, other faculties & powers
were conferred on it for other purposes and to
accomplish objects not committed to the care
of Congress, it would be very clear that the
power to create the Õscal agent would not
authorize such a violation of the principles of
the constitution. Suppose Congress, for the
purpose of counteracting the republican
principles on which our institutions are
founded, and to vest more power in the hands
of a monied aristocracy, should under the name
of a mere Õscal agent establish a vast monied
monopoly with a capital inÕnitely beyond its
wants as a Treasury agent, & give to it powers &
capacities which enabled it to exercise a
controlling inÔuence in elections, in Congress,
in the courts & over all the operations of the
Government & to bring ruin on any portion of
the community which should venture to
oppose its wishes? Nobody would say that the
power to create such a corporation for such
purposes was intended to be given by the
constitution. Nobody would say that the
people of the U. States intended to give
Congress the power to alter the ruling principle
of the Government. But could the Judiciary
declare such a law to be unconstitutional &
void? Could the courts undertake to deÕne
what amount of Capital was necessary & what
powers & privileges were required to enable the
Õscal agent to collect and distribute the
revenue? In the case of McCulloch vs. The
State of Maryland before referred to the
Supreme Court have said that the judiciary has
no such a power & that the Legislature are the
only judges of the means necessary to be used
to accomplish the object. And the inability of
the Court to correct an evil like the one above
supposed grows out of the nature of judicial
power. For if the Court should undertake to say
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how much capital and what capacities and
powers were necessary they would exercise a
Legislative and not a judicial function. If they
could say that too much has been given, they
must be able to say precisely how much would
suÓce. They must be able to Õx certain deÕned
limits over which the Legislative body could
not pass either in the amount of capital or in
the powers and privileges to be given to this
agent of the Treasury. It is obviously not always
possible for the Legislature to do this with
absolute certainty, with all its means of
knowledge and latitude of inquiry and [it is]
perfectly impossible for a judicial tribunal. And
it is moreover evident that the enquiries and
considerations which are necessary to lead to a
just conclusion are in their nature Legislative &
not judicial.
Here then is a case of manifest usurpation
and whether we call it the abuse of a power
granted or an unconstitutional exercise of
power, it is in either case equally beyond the
reach of correction by the judicial tribunals.
The same principles apply with equal force
to the Legislative act of South Carolina &
prove that it is impossible for the judicial
power to ascertain and decide whether milder
measures would not have been suÓcient to
secure their citizens from the apprehended
danger. And as no tribunal but a judicial one
can pronounce the law of the state to be
unconstitutional & void and the judicial
power cannot reach this case it follows that the
Legislative action of the state on this subject
cannot be controlled by any Branch of the
General Government. For it will not be contended that the Legislative or the Executive
branches of the Federal Government could
constitutionally declare the law of a State to be
null & void on any grounds.
If it should be asked where then is the
remedy for such an abuse of power by
Congress as is above supposed? I answer that
the remedy is in the hands of their constituents from whom they derived their Legislative
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authority. It is in the hands of the people of the
U. States who are represented in the House of
Representatives – in the Senate who represent
the States, and the President who is chosen by
the combined power of the States and the
people. They are all made responsible to their
constituents after a certain period of service
and if they have abused the Legislative power
conferred on them & used it for unauthorized
purposes, others may be chosen who will
annul & declare void the acts of usurpation or
abuse committed by their predecessors. Every
Legislative body may review every act of
legislation passed by those who preceded
them. They may determine whether the
Legislative discretion & power has been exercised for the purposes contemplated by the
constitution, or abused in order to accomplish
objects never intended to be submitted to
their judgment. And the Legislative body like
all other tribunals consisting of more than one
person must in coming to their decision be
governed by the will of the majority. And
where the Legislative acts of Congress are to
be reviewed, no one District and no one state
can exercise this power in opposition to the
will of the majority any more than a single
judge in the Supreme Court in a question of
judicial cognizance could declare a law to be
unconstitutional in opposition to the opinions
of the other six judges who with him constitute the tribunal of revision.
It may be said that this will not be found to
be a suÓcient safeguard against such abuses of
Legislative discretion as are beyond the reach
of judicial power. But the answer is obvious.
The Constitution has provided none other &
we cannot engraft on it a new principle nor
can its defects be amended except in the mode
prescribed by the instrument. And if it could
be demonstrated that the responsibility I have
stated is inadequate and nugatory, it would by
no means follow that such a state of things

would justify an usurpation of power by any
branch of the Government or by a single state.
But it is evident from the nature of representative Legislative power that no other tribunal
can be devised to which the power of revision
can be safely committed. For if it is entrusted to
any other hands, it puts an end to republican
representative government. And moreover the
safeguard against abuse above insisted on is
abundantly suÓcient and is placed in competent & proper hands. For to deny the
suÓciency and safety of this tribunal is to
question the political axiom on which the
General and State Governments of this
country are all founded. The delegated power
expires after a limited period in order that the
proper constituent body may select other
agents to correct any evil produced by the error
or misconduct of their former representatives –
and may delegate Legislative power to more
competent & trustworthy hands. The very
power of selection presupposes the capacity to
judge the conduct of the agent selected. And
experience as well as theory proves that no
tribunal can be formed so likely to come to just
conclusions on all questions of Legislative
discretion as the great body of the people
themselves. I am sensible that I have extended
this discussion more than the particular point
on which my opinion is called for necessarily
requires. But you will readily perceive that the
questions of constitutional power & of Legislative and judicial power upon which I have
presented my views are all intimately
connected with the enquiries to which the law
of South Carolina has given rise. And they are
not only questions of the highest importance
but they are the exciting topics of the day. I have
therefore felt anxious to make myself fully
understood and to state with precision and
with proper limitations the principles which I
believe to be correct and the reasons by which
they are sustained.
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III. Comments
Attorney General Taney’s argument about the
South Carolina Police Bill25 was complex and,
as far as we know, he never had the opportunity to “put the whole matter in proper form”
as he indicated he hoped to do in his June 9
cover letter. In addition, while the existing
copy of the June 9 supplement seems to reÔect
Taney’s Õnal edits, the extant draft of the May
28 main opinion does not reÔect any changes
Taney might have wished to make after reading a clean copy of that document. We must
be hesitant, therefore, about putting excessive
weight on details. That said, taken together
the main opinion and supplement present a
coherent response to Secretary Livingston’s
enquiry, one that reÔects both Taney’s position
in President Jackson’s party and administration, and Taney’s own particular views. In this
section I shall present an outline of Taney’s
argument, and then address brieÔy some
issues of particular interest.

Outline of the argument
I. Introduction.
II. The answer to be given to the British
government: the Police Bill is consistent
with the treaty.
A. The commercial freedom guaranteed
by the treaty is expressly subject to the
municipal laws of each country.

B. Under the treaty, British subjects
have no exemption from any law
being enforced against U.S. citizens
and not yet held invalid by a court
with jurisdiction.26
C. The British government has no
standing to object that an American
statute is unconstitutional, although
a British subject can raise the issue in
a legal action.
III. Taney’s answer to Livingston on the
constitutional question: the Police Bill is
constitutional because it is the exercise of a
power reserved to the states.
A. The treaty power is subject to constitutional limitations and cannot be
used to interfere with the states’
ability to exercise reserved powers.
B. The power to regulate free people of
color without federal limitation is a
power the states reserved to themselves.
1. Given the importance of this
power to the security of slaveholding states, only the most
express constitutional language
could properly be construed as a
surrender of it. There is no such
language in the Constitution.
2. African Americans neither were
nor are part of the sovereign people, and general constitutional

25 Interestingly, Taney never mentioned the North Carolina statute that was the immediate cause of
the most recent British protest.
26 Taney simply ignored Justice Johnson’s decision in Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (No. 4355)
(C.C.D.S.C. 1823). That Taney was unaware of Elkison is highly implausible and his failure to
mention it seems diÓcult to defend. It is possible that he thought the decision lacked authority
because it was not reviewed by the Supreme Court, or because there had been serious questions
about the circuit court’s jurisdiction to order relief for the plaintiÖ. ( Justice Jackson had conceded
that the Judiciary Act did not give the court the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a person in
state jurisdiction, although he concluded that he did have the authority to issue a common law writ
of de homine replegiando. Id. at 496-98.)
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language about “citizens,” etc.,
cannot properly be construed to
encompass them. Note 1 in
Taney’s supplement further
expands on this argument, with
particular attention to the general language of the Declaration
of Independence.
excursus: Great Britain views Africans in
the same manner and for that reason and
because of British awareness of the American view, the general language of the
treaty cannot properly be construed to
encompass seamen of color.
IV. A diÖerent objection answered: the question of whether the Police Bill is excessive
or unnecessarily harsh is one exclusively
for the South Carolina legislature.
A. The means employed in exercising a
constitutional power are a matter on
which the legislature must exercise its
discretion.
B. The Supreme Court’s decision in
M’Culloch v. Maryland endorses and
illustrates this principle, and shows
that the power of judicial review does
not extend to invalidating legislation
on the ground that it is unnecessary
or oppressive.
C. What then is the remedy for oppressive legislation? (Note 2 in Taney’s
supplement is an extensive elaboration on various aspects of this
question as well as an ampliÕcation of
the earlier discussion of M’Culloch.)
1. A statute that is the exercise of a
power not delegated to the
legislature which enacted it is
subject to judicial review and
invalidation.
2. In situations where Congress
and a state legislature have each
exercised a power properly
belong to itself, and the statutes
conÔict, the conÔict is subject to

judicial resolution and, if necessary, the state statute must give
way to the federal.
3. A statute that is an oppressive
abuse or misuse of a power delegated to the legislature which
enacted it is not subject to judicial invalidation or executive suspension. The remedy in such a
case lies with the people, who can
elect new representatives to undo
the mischief. Until and if the
people do so, the law is binding.
4. Recognizing a state legislature’s
discretion to enact laws such as
the Police Bill poses no political
danger since self interest will
prevent a legislature from interfering with commerce more than
it deems absolutely necessary.
V. What about the Supreme Court?
A. The Court holds views of constitutional interpretation that Taney
believes erroneous and is, as a result,
likely to invalidate the Police Bill if it
should come before the Court.
B. Nevertheless, the executive should
not adopt in advance the Court’s
probable position since it is
erroneous.
1. A Supreme Court decision may
bind the parties before it but
does not Õx the construction of
the Constitution for other
constitutional actors.
2. The executive may and should
reserve judgment over what to do
if the Court were to invalidate
the Police Bill.

The opinion  nulliÕcation
One need not put in question the sincerity
with which Attorney General Taney held the
views he presented to note that his opinion
reached constitutional conclusions relating to
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the tariÖ of abominations and nulliÕcation
that accorded nicely with the political
position of the Jackson administration. On a
practical level, by concluding that the South
Carolina Police Bill did not contravene the
British treaty, and that if it did it would be
valid as a domestic law, Taney avoided any
need for the administration to take actions
with respect to a side issue (the Police Bill)
that would further inÔame public opinion in
that volatile state. As a matter of constitutional principle, furthermore, Taney readily
conceded the nulliÕers’ traditionally JeÖersonian points that a federal statute such as a
tariÖ can be an abuse of power, because it
bears more heavily on one region, or a misuse
of congressional power, because Congress’s
real object was to address matters over which
the Constitution was not meant to give it
power. But Taney parted company with
Calhoun and his allies over the issue of
remedy. The solution, and the only solution,
for a case involving the abuse or misuse of a
power delegated to Congress lay not in the
actions of individual states but in the
national political process.
I answer that the remedy is in the hands of
their constituents from whom they derived
their Legislative authority. It is in the hands of
the people of the U. States who are represented in the House of Representatives – in
the Senate who represent the States, and the
President who is chosen by the combined
power of the States and the people. … And
where the Legislative acts of Congress are to
be reviewed, no one District and no one state
can exercise this power in opposition to the
will of the majority.

The tariÖ of abominations might be “unjust &
unequal,” but until it was repealed, “the law
would I apprehend be constitutional & valid –
& every body bound to obey it – because the
constitution has given the power and left the
mode of exercising it to the discretion of
Congress.” President Jackson, in short, was
right, and nulliÕcation a constitutional fantasy
that, if acted on, would be treason.27

A Jacksonian reading of
M’Culloch v. Maryland
Attorney General Taney wrote his opinion on
the South Carolina Police Bill as the political
battle over the rechartering of the Bank of the
United States entered its Õnal stages. The
Bank bill passed the Senate only two days
after Taney sent Secretary Livingston his
supplementary notes; on July 3 the House
approved the bill and sent it to Jackson. Old
Hickory was generally expected to veto it –
indeed, the anti-Jackson forces in Congress
beat oÖ an attempt by pro-Bank Democrats to
delay consideration of the bill precisely
because the president’s opponents saw a veto
as their best campaign issue in the fall elections. Much would depend, electorally and
otherwise, on the grounds Jackson presented
for his veto, a fact of which the president and
his advisors were well aware. “The bank,”
Jackson told Martin Van Buren on July 4, “is
trying to kill me, but I will kill it.”28
The politically safest basis for a Bank veto
was to rest it on the president’s duty to uphold
the Constitution, and for this reason Jackson’s
opponents were eager to deny him that ground.
The Supreme Court upheld the Bank’s validity

27 Jackson’s subsequent proclamation denouncing nulliÕcation (Dec. 10, 1832) went further than Taney
approved, however, at least as he remembered events years later. Taney, Memorandum ( July 1861),
quoted in Tyler, Memoir, at 188-89: “I was at Annapolis attending Court, when General Jackson’s
proclamation at the time of the South Carolina nulliÕcation was prepared, and never saw it until it
was in print, and certainly should have objected to some of the principles stated in it, if I had been in
Washington.”
28 See Remini, Course of American Freedom, at 364-67 for the events and the quotation, originally
published by Van Buren in his autobiography.
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in M’Culloch v. Maryland, they argued, and the
issue was settled. Taney’s initial instinct seems
to have been to minimize any comments in his
opinion for Livingston that might bear on the
Bank controversy, and his May 28 opinion did
not mention the Bank at all and referred to
M’Culloch only brieÔy. By June 9, Taney had
changed his mind, and by far the larger of the
two supplementary notes he sent Livingston
on that date used the issue of legislative
discretion as an opportunity for a signiÕcant
commentary on the Bank and M’Culloch.
No one reading the June 9 document would
have any doubt about Taney’s view of the
Bank. Under the transparent veil of a
hypothetical, Taney repeated the accusation of
anti-democratic corruption that was at the
heart of his and Jackson’s hatred for the Bank.
Suppose Congress, for the purpose of
counteracting the republican principles on
which our institutions are founded, and to vest
more power in the hands of a monied
aristocracy, should under the name of a mere
Õscal agent establish a vast monied monopoly
with a capital inÕnitely beyond its wants as a
Treasury agent, & give to it powers &
capacities which enabled it to exercise a
controlling inÔuence in elections, in Congress,
in the courts & over all the operations of the
Government & to bring ruin on any portion of
the community which should venture to
oppose its wishes?

“Nobody would say that the power to create
such a corporation for such purposes was
intended to be given by the constitution.” On
this view of the Bank, its unconstitutionality
was clear. But what about M’Culloch, “generally
said to be a decision in favor of the constitutionality of the present Bank?”
“I do not so understand it,” Taney wrote
boldly, and then proceeded to explain that

M’Culloch was a decision not about federalism
but instead about the separation of powers
between the political branches and the
judiciary. Once the Court had decided that the
taxing and spending powers authorize
Congress “to establish Õscal agents whenever it
pleases to eÖectuate the objects” of those
powers, M’Culloch was an easy case. The issues
of whether to incorporate the government’s
“Õscal agent” and of what powers to give it, were
strictly ones for legislative judgment, and thus
beyond the competence of the Court. Even if
the Bank was in fact intended as an engine of
oppression, the Court could not reach such a
conclusion judicially.
Before they could have come to this conclusion, it would have been necessary for them to
look at the subject as Legislators & to enter on
the examinations & reasonings & to take into
consideration the subjects which belong exclusively to Legislation and not to the judiciary.
This it is evident a court from the nature &
character of its functions cannot do & therefore it had not the right to say that the law establishing the Bank was a violation of the
constitution.

Rather than undermining the legitimacy of a
veto, when read properly M’Culloch v. Maryland
made it clear that the president was entitled
and indeed obligated to reach his own independent judgment about the constitutionality of
the Bank! M’Culloch was a decision about the
limitations on judicial power in a “republican
representative government,” not an emancipation of the government from constitutional
constraints. Where those constraints cannot
be enforced by the courts, by necessary implication (one acknowledged by Chief Justice
Marshall in the Court’s opinion29) they are to
be enforced by the political branches, which are

29 Marshall, it should be remembered, never argued that the issue of the Bank’s necessity was simply
non-constitutional; instead, he insisted that “the decree of its necessity, as has been very justly
observed, is to be discussed in another place.” M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423
(1819).
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themselves in turn controlled by the voters.
One month after Taney sent Livingston his
analysis of M’Culloch, President Jackson vetoed
the Bank bill. His veto message, in the drafting
of which Taney was intimately involved,
clearly drew on the thinking Taney had
already done on the meaning of the Supreme
Court’s decision, and on the authority of the
Court’s decisions more generally. Jackson
followed Taney’s argument about the Court’s
actual holding: “Under the decision of the
Supreme Court … it is the exclusive province
of Congress and the President to decide
whether the particular features of this act are
necessary and proper … or unnecessary and
improper, and therefore unconstitutional.”30

The authority of
Supreme Court decisions
One of the enduring legends of American
constitutional history is the assertion that
President Jackson stated, in the wake of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Worcester v.
Georgia: “John Marshall has made his decision,
now let him enforce it.”31 The kernel of truth in
this Õction is that Jackson held a traditionally
JeÖersonian view of the signiÕcance of judicial
review. JeÖerson never denied that courts may
decline to enforce statutes (or executive action)
that they believe unconstitutional, and his
successor Madison expressly aÓrmed the
executive’s duty to enforce judicial decrees, but
at the same time JeÖerson at least clearly
rejected any claim that the reasoning of a

Supreme Court decision binds the other
branches of government.32 Jackson’s 1832 veto of
the Bank bill restated this position forcefully:
“The Congress, the Executive, and the Court
must each for itself be guided by its own
opinion of the Constitution.”33 As Taney’s
attorney general opinion shows, he was in
complete accord with Jackson. A Supreme
Court decision does not Õx “of itself irrevocably
& permanently” the correct interpretation of
the Constitution, Taney wrote, “whatever may
be the force of the decision of the Supreme
Court in binding the parties and settling their
rights in the particular case before them.”
Taney therefore rejected any suggestion that
“the Executive [should] adopt in advance the
construction” of the Constitution “which I
think may be given by the Court,” in other
words by declaring the Police Bill unconstitutional on its own accord.
Some language in Taney’s opinion (leaving
open “whatever may be proper to be done if the
Court should hereafter declare the law in
question to be void”) could be read to advance
a further, and more radical proposition, that (as
the apocrypha about Jackson quoted above
suggests) the executive branch need not enforce
a judicial decision if it thinks the Court in error.
In the context of the entire opinion, however, I
think this is an unnecessary and indeed
unlikely interpretation of Taney’s meaning.
One of the premises of Taney’s argument that
the Police Bill was currently binding on
American citizens and thus, by virtue of the

30 Jackson, Veto Message ( July 10, 1832), 2 Richardson, Messages and Papers, at 1146.
31 Decided in early 1832, Worcester upheld the supremacy of federal statutes and, in dictum, treaties
dealing with Native American nations over contrary state legislation. See 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
Like the notion that Marbury v. Madison invented judicial review, this bit of folklore is a hardy
perennial that has survived any number of burials. For a recent eÖort by an historian expert in the
period see Charles F. Hobson, The Great Chief Justice 179 (1996): “There is no proof that Jackson
ever uttered this statement; indeed, there is no evidence that he ignored his constitutional duty to
enforce the Court’s judgment even though from the beginning he bitterly resented the judiciary’s
interference in the Cherokee business.”
32 On the positions of JeÖerson and Madison, see JeÖerson Powell, Languages of Power: A Sourcebook
of Early American Constitutional History 158-60, 249-55 (1991).
33 2 Richardson, Messages and Papers, at 1145.
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treaty, on British subjects as well, was his
assertion that “[n]o judicial tribunal of
competent authority has pronounced the law
to be unconstitutional.” Taney’s subsequent
discussion repeatedly assumed that the validity
of the Police Bill would be subject to challenge
in court. All his reservation of judgment about
the future course of executive action needs to
have meant was that the executive branch had
no current reason to determine what steps, if
any, it would take in the wake of a judicial
decision holding the Police Bill unconstitutional beyond enforcing the court decree against
the parties.
It is unclear that Taney adhered to this
JeÖersonian understanding of the Supreme
Court’s authority by the late 1850s and it is, at
the very least, a controversial position today.
Perhaps ironically, its most distinguished
adherent in addition to JeÖerson, Jackson and
Taney was Abraham Lincoln. It was Lincoln,
of course, who in response to Chief Justice
Taney’s opinion in the Dred Scott Case,34
rejected the argument that the Taney Court’s
views on slavery and the Constitution bound
the nation, although he conceded without
hesitation that the Court’s judgment was
conclusive on the parties before it.35

African Americans  citizenship
Most modern interest in Attorney General
Taney’s 1832 opinion has focused on the two
passages, one in the May 28 main opinion and
the other making up “note 1” of the June 9
supplement, that clearly foreshadow Chief
Justice Taney’s infamous opinion in the Dred
Scott Case. In 1832, Taney described African
Americans as “a degraded class” that “has
never been regarded as a portion of the people
of this country.” He asserted that “no one ever
supposed that the African race in this country
were entitled to the beneÕt of th[e Declaration
of Independence], nor did any one imagine
that they had a right to claim the extension of
that great principle to themselves.” Each of
these remarks is picked up and elaborated in
1857 in Dred Scott.36 The repellant views Taney
expressed in that case were not created out of
whole cloth: they developed out of ideas he
had expressed a quarter century before. As
Don E. Fehrenbacher wrote in his great book
on Dred Scott, “Taney, in 1832, formulated the
same harsh racial doctrine that he would
proclaim from the bench” in 1857.37
There was, however, a slight diÖerence
between Taney’s two statements of his “racial

34 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
35
I do not forget the position assumed by some that constitutional questions are to be decided
by the Supreme Court, nor do I deny that such decisions must be binding in any case upon
the parties to a suit as to the object of that suit … . At the same time … if the policy of the
Government upon vital questions aÖecting the whole people is to be irrevocably Õxed by
decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation between
parties in personal actions the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that
extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.
Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), 5 Richardson, Messages and Papers,at 3210.
36 African Americans
are not included and were not intended to be included, under the word ‘citizens’ in the
Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument
provides for and secures to citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they were at that
time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the
dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and
had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government might
choose to grant them.
60 U.S. (19 How.) at 404-05.
37 Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case 70 (1978).
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doctrine.” As attorney general, Taney never
Ôatly stated that African Americans cannot be
citizens of the United States. The facts (as
Taney claimed them to be) that African
Americans were not members of the bodies
politic that adopted the Constitution and had
never been viewed as part of the American
people were, in 1832, aids to construing the
Constitution and the treaty with Great
Britain. They did not, in and of themselves,
necessarily exclude the possibility that free
African Americans might be, or become,
citizens of the United States, even if citizens
with sharply curtailed rights. Indeed, this
latter possibility may have occurred to Taney:
in a passage dealing with the construction of
the British treaty that he crossed out, Taney
commented that “slaves in the U. States are in
no sense of the word ‘citizens,’” which may
imply a concession that in some sense free
African Americans were.38 The issue was a
hotly debated one in the pre-Dred Scott period;
in 1843, an attorney general concluded that for
the purposes of a federal land statute free

African Americans were entitled to be treated
as United States citizens.39 By 1857, however,
Taney was determined to eliminate any
ambiguity about the issue of African American citizenship, and his ugly “racial doctrine”
had become not merely a tool of interpretation
but a rule of complete racial exclusion.


From a contemporary perspective, Attorney
General Taney’s 1832 opinion reÔects with
striking clarity the complexities of Jacksonian
Democratic thought, and perhaps of American
democracy generally. Taney’s racial attitudes,
and for many of us his sectionalistic loyalties,
seem of another (and morally unattractive)
time. At the same time, I believe that Taney’s
robust faith in electoral democracy as the only
legitimate form of American government, and
his belief that it is government’s duty to
safeguard its own proper subordination to the
democratic political process, are constitutional
principles that we neglect only at our peril. B

38 The crossed-out section, see note 23 above, argued that the British interpretation of the treaty was
incorrect because it would aÖord a privilege to British West Indian slaves (who were in a broad sense
British “subjects”) not ensured to American slaves (who were not United States “citizens”). Taney’s
deletion of the argument may reÔect his awareness that the British Parliament was on the brink of
abolishing slavery in the West Indian colonies. Parliament actually passed the Emancipation Act on
July 31, 1833, but the Õnal debate over the measure began in May of 1832.
39 Pre-Emption Rights of Colored Persons, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 147 (1843). The author of this opinion,
Hugh Swinton Legaré, was (ironically enough) a South Carolina slaveholder.
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